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Abstract
In noncooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is
usually assumed that cartel members will maximize their joint payoffs.
Through an example, this note shows that this assumption is prob-
lematic, because it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on cartel
members’ actions. We recommend that the cartel agreement should
be endogenously determined in future studies.
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1 Introduction
The noncooperative open membership cartel (coalition) formation model
has been widely applied in many economic situations, such as collusion in
oligopolistic markets (d’Aspremont et al., 1983; Diamantoudi, 2005), R&D
joint ventures (Katz, 1986), international environmental agreements (Bar-
rett, 1994; Finus, 2001), and sharing of natural resources (Miller and Nkuiya,
2016).1 In a typical application of this model, cooperation among a group
of players may potentially create a surplus. However, the existence of exter-
nalities and lack of binding agreements may cause free rider problem, which
can hinder cooperation and lead to inefficient outcomes.
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One possible method to overcome this problem is to form a cartel that
regulates its members’ actions. Those players that voluntarily choose to be
a member will form the cartel and sign a self-enforcing agreement. When
payoffs are transferable, a commonly used assumption about the agreement
is that all cartel members should coordinate their actions, so as to maximize
their joint payoffs. This is a very intuitive assumption, since otherwise the
cartel members are likely to renegotiate among themselves to change the
agreement so that they could all get larger payoffs.
However, is this a reasonable assumption? To the best of my knowledge,
few studies in the literature have considered this question. Through a very
simple example, this note shows that this assumption is indeed problematic,
because it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on members’ actions.
2 An example
Suppose that there is a public good, which may be produced by a set N =
{1, 2, . . . , 5} of homogeneous players. Let xi denote player i’s product. Player
i’s payoff is ui =
∑
i∈N xi − 12x2i , which depends on the total product of the
good
∑
i∈N xi and i’s individual cost
1
2
x2i .
The social welfare is the sum of all players’ payoffs
∑
i∈N ui, which is
maximized when x∗i = 5 for all i. However, each player’s dominant product
is xi = 1 < x
∗
i , regardless other players’ actions. This commonly known
social dilemma of insufficient provision of public good is mainly caused by
the free rider problem.
To overcome this problem, we can form a cartel so as to coordinate its
members’ actions. Consider a two-stage cartel formation game. In stage one,
all players simultaneously decide whether or not to join the cartel. Those
choosing to join become cartel members2. In stage two, all cartel members
coordinate actions to maximize their joint payoffs, while simultaneously non-
members choose their own actions.
This game can be solved by backward induction. Suppose that the cartel
2This is usually called the open membership rule of cartel formation, since no player
can be prevented from becoming a cartel member.
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formed in stage one is M , with cardinality |M | = m. In stage two, each non-
member j /∈ M still chooses the dominant product xj = 1. Each member
i ∈M chooses xi to maximize
∑
i∈M ui, leading to xi = m. Hence, given m,
the payoff of a cartel member is uC(m) = 5 + 1
2
m2 −m, while the payoff of
a non-member is uI(m) = 4.5 + m2 −m.
We apply the stability concept introduced by d’Aspremont et al. (1983)
to predict which cartel will form in stage one. A cartel M /∈ {∅, N} is said to
be stable if uI(m) > uC(m+1), and uC(m) ≥ uI(m−1). Further, N is stable
if uC(n) ≥ uI(n−1), while ∅ is stable if uI(0) > uC(1). A stable cartel is one
in which no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from his or her
participation decision. In our example, the condition for M to be stable is
m = 3. Therefore, the payoff of a cartel member is uC(3) = 6.5; the payoff of a
non-member is uI(3) = 10.5; and the social welfare is 3uC(3)+2uI(3) = 40.5.
A key assumption in this model is that all members take their actions
collectively so as to maximize joint cartel payoffs. We call this the MJP
assumption. In our example, this assumption requires each member i ∈ M
to follow a specific agreement in stage two—to produce xi = m if |M | = m.
But is this a reasonable assumption? Let us examine this cartel formation
game with the following agreement: each member i ∈ M should produce
xi = 0.65m if |M | = m. Under this alternative assumption, it is easy to
verify that the condition for M to be stable is m = 5, the payoff of each
member is 10.97, and the social welfare is 54.84.
This shows that everyone (including members, non-members, and the
social planner who cares about social welfare) will agree to change the cartel
agreement from xi = m to xi = 0.65m. The new agreement is better than the
one derived by using the MJP assumption, irrespective of the criterion used to
evaluate it. Intuitively, this is because the new agreement is less demanding
for cartel members than that based on the MJP assumption,3 leading to a
smaller incentive for players to free-ride on other players’ effort. As a result,
more players choose to join the cartel and a more efficient outcome is realized.
3When m ≥ 2, xi = 0.65m is closer to the dominant product xi = 1 than xi = m is.
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3 Discussion
We have shown that the MJP assumption might not be appropriate since, at
least under some situations, everyone has an incentive to replace the agree-
ment based on the MJP assumption by a less demanding one. The problem
with the former is that it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on members’
actions. The members should only care about their payoffs in a stable cartel,
instead of those in all possible cartels, which the MJP assumption requires.
It is these redundant requirements that undermine the MJP assumption.
Hence, the MJP assumption is problematic despite seeming quite intuitive
and being widely applied.
Since agreements are not binding, some readers may wonder whether
the non-MJP agreement xi = 0.65m is renegotiation-proof against the MJP
agreement xi = m. That is, once the cartel is formed and all players receive
their payoffs under xi = 0.65m, will the members have incentives to switch
this agreement to the MJP agreement xi = m? In fact, none of the members
will choose to do so, since otherwise the payoff of each of them will either
decrease from 10.97 to 6.5 (as a member), or decrease from 10.97 to 10.5 (as
a non-member).
Another interesting question is whether the new agreement (xi = 0.65m)
is “optimal”. The point is that an explicit criterion is needed to established
whether or not an agreement is “optimal”. For future studies, a lesson we
can learn from this note is that a cartel agreement should be endogenously
determined, rather than exogenously given. Some studies (Carraro et al.,
2009; Ko¨ke and Lange, 2017; Mao, 2017) have already discussed endogenous
agreements in some specific applications, but more work is needed in more
general situations.
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